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Article 5

NOTES ON RECENT CASES*
CRIMINAL LAW-The right of self-defense does not accrue to a person until he has availed himself of all proper means
in his power to decline the combat. Commonwealth v. Trippi
(Mass.) 167 N. E. 354.
An ingenous and novel defense was introduced in this Massachusetts homicide case The trial court had convicted Trippi
of first degree murder for the killing of a prison guard who resisted Trippi's attempted escape from the Massachusetts State
Prison. The defense attempted to show by defendant's testimony that at the time the shooting took place Trippi had abandoned his attempt to escape and shot the officer in self-defence.
In his confession the defendant said that when the officers came
up to get him they pulled out their guns, that he pulled out his
gun and said, "All right fellows, put them up." Instead of putting up their hands the defendant stated that they fired at him
and that he fired back, and that if the officers had put up their
hands he would have just made them keep quiet until he got over
the cupola. In his testimony he denied that he was still attempting to escape at the time.
At the trial the defense requested the following instructions, the refusal of which is the basis of this appeal. The instruction requested was: "If the jury find that the defendant
Trippi at any time prior to the shooting of the deceased Pflager
(the prison guard) had abandoned his attempt to escape and
that after such abandonment he found himself threatened with
great bodily harm or death he would be justified in using necessary force to defend himself to the extent of taking life."'
The Supreme Court of course upheld the refusal of such an
instruction, saying "The right of self-defense does not accrue
to a person until he has availed himself of all proper means in
his power to decline the combat."
L. A. O'Connor
*With this issue we are inaugurating a new policy in conducting this
department of the LAWYER. The new plan has been adopted with the
view of providing the students with a digest of current decisions of the
various courts on questions of great moment. It is hoped that this added
feature will prove of greater value to readers than the former plan of reporting isolated cases.
Editor
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TELEPHONE RATES-Penalty for Past due Payment.
In the case of RE MIDDLE STATES UTILITIES COMPANY (Mo.) P. U. R. 1929B 554 there was a petition for a
penalty of 10 percent on telphone bills if not paid bythe date due
in the current month. The Missouri Public Service Commission did not allow the claim, as if was of the opinion that such a
penalty was unecessary in view of the fact that the Company is
receiving payment for service during the month in which the
service is rendered, and the Company is also armed with the
right to discontinue its service if payment is not paid promptly
for which it may charge a reconnecting fee. The Commission
professed its willingness to grant all companies all protection necessary for the collection of bills, but to grant additional penalty
to those already allowed would be unjust to the subscribers
especially where they pay for the service in the current month.
Yet, in an earlier case decided by the same Commission it
ordered the Company to establish rules for the securing of prompt
payment for telephone service and said the Company should be
required to collect outstanding accounts due, since the good
paying subscribers were at the present time being penalized by
the action of the Company in allowing the poor paying subscrlbers to be furnished service. IN RE WINFIELD TELEPHONE
CO. CASE NO. 3700, 1923.
However, in the case of IN RE NORTHERN INDIAN
TELEPHONE COMPANY (Ind.) P. U. R. 1929A, 74 the Indiana Public Service Commission allowed a collection sharge of
25 cents per month on all bills that are not paid on or before the
15th of the month in which.the service is rendered. It i s noted
that- in this jurisdiction the companies may also discontinue
service but the span of the delinquent period is greater than
that allow'ed in Missouri. It is probable on this ground that the
Indiana Commission has allowed the aditional penalty to encourage prompt payment. This same Commission in the case of
IN RE PEOPLES CO-OPERATIVE TELEPHONE COMPANY (Ind.) P. U. R. 1928 D, 528 allowed a request for a 25
percent per month penalty on all rural accounts where the bills
were not paid on or before the 15th day of the middle month
of each quarterly period.
Here the discouragement for tardy
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remittance amounted to as high as $1.50 on each bill, but the
Commission seemed convinced that this was not unreasonable
as the collection in rural districts was somewhat more tedious
and the expense of collection greater than in cities.
It is interesting to note that the Illinois Commerce Commission ordered the Illinois Telephone Company to refund to its
subscriber a reconnection charge of $3.50, as that Company had
no authority from the Commission to make such charges, and
when the Company did apply for such permission it was limited
to a charge of $1.00 for reconnection after discontinuence of
service for slow payment. HOWARD v. ILLINOIS TELEPHONE COMPANY (Ill.) P. U. R. 1924E, 386. The Illinois
Commision reflects very conservative ideas in regard to penalties in a decision some nine years ealier when it said, "The proposed penalty ($0.25 against all subscribers who fail to pay within thirty days from the date the bills are due) appears to be an
unreasonable regulation. The Commission recognizes that a
telephone Company has the right to establish rules and regulations governing the conduct and operations of its business when
such rules and regulations are reasonable in their requirements,
and a rule which provides for the payment of rentals within a
prescribed period is a regulation of the permitted character; and
so is a further regulation that unless payment is made the service
shall be discontinued. This should afford ample means for protecting the utility against patrons who are careless in making
payments, or who deliberately refuse to make payment within
the prescribed period. The Commission does not approve of
penalty in the form of an additional charge against subscribers
who fail to pay promptly." IN RE ST. PETER TELEPHONE
CO. (ILL.) P. U. R. 1915B, 350.
When the Home Telephone and Telegraph Company found
its accounts receivable swelling to unbecoming proportions it
appealed to the Oregon Public Service Commission for some
counteracting pursuasion in the way of a 10 per cent penance
for nonpayment of all toll bills and a 50 cents reconnection charge
when service is discontinued for nonpayment of bills. But the
Commission felt that a telephone company is peculiarly advantageously situated to control collection of its accounts by means
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of denial or temporary disconnection of service to delinquent
subscribers. The Commission' then decided that until the Company could show that it had exhausted all the remedies that it
now possessed it would not sanction the imposition of a cash
penalty for failure to make prompt payment of bills. The fact
that the penalty if allowed would be imposed on charges billed in
advance and not yet due and owing exerted considerable influence
in their decision. IN RE HOME TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY (Ore.) P. U. R. 19164, 579.
The Alabama Public Service Commission authorized an increase in telephone rates amounting to 25 percent per' telephone
per month with a provision permitting a-discount or reduction of
the same amouiit to all patrons paying their bills for the preceeding month by the 10th of the following month. The Commission said, "It is not only right, but the duty of a utility' of
this character to conduct its business as economically as possible,
consistant with its obligation to render adequate service At the
same time an obligation rests on the public that uses the service
of the utility to pay the lawfully established charges therefor
promptly." IN RE DEMOPOLIS TELEPHONE COMPANY
(Ala.) Docket No. 4282, 1923. In accord with this is the decision
of the Kansas Public Utilities Commission that found it absolutely necessary for a telephone utility to establish and put into
force a rule providing a penalty for failure to pay promptly.
IN RE NORTON COUNTY TELEPHONE COMPANY
Docket No. 5327, 1923.
Norman J. Hartzer
COMMON CARRIERS-Elevators-Operators as Carriers
-Degree of care toward Passenger-Plaintiff, a traveling salesman, was a paying guest of the hotel owned and operated by the
defendant. In going to his room, plaintiff approached the hotel
elevator by way of a dark hall, found the cage door open at the
elevator, stepped in, and fell to the bottom of the shaft, a distance
of about twelve feet, the cage at the time having been left by
someone at the second floor. Plaintiff, sustaining a broken leg
and being otherwise severely and permanently iijured, brought
ah action for damages. Held, the owner and operator of an elevator is not a common carrier of passengers, but the degree of
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:care, pqiuredc:f,,an.innkeepertoward his guest, with reference to
his~passenger elevator, is -similar to that of a common carrier
.towardcits passengers. '2M-c1D)owellv.,Rockey (Ohio, 1929) 167
"N.'E. 5589.
iAlthough -this case involves a question upon which the
authorities are'not -in, agreenent, ithe Ohio court adopted the
itoctrine w-vhih" is ,followed -in most jurisdictions-a doctrine
-vrhich 'is well establighed -upon the 'more reasonable -theory of
the law. '(Hut hinsonCarriers -(3d.ed) §100.) A vast number
of jurisdictions Ihold -that, the proprietor is in the position or
suStainsl the: liability-of a commoni carrier or. has a liability which
'is.analogoustto, that, 6f. a, common, catrier. -Eweeden v. Atkinson
93 Ark..397, I5.-S. W.-439,27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 124;,Goodsell v.
Wajrlor-41 Minn. 207, 4 L. iR. A. 673; -Southern Build. & Loan
,-ssoc.v.)I awson 97.Tenn. :367, 56 A. -S. R. 804;, Quimby v. Bee
N. W. 118;,Wilmarth v. Pacific Mut.
"193,427
LBBldg.t-Co.,'87'N~b.
7Life!1ns. Co. '168, Cal. 536,,143"Tac. 780. The relation of carrier
'arfd passenger, did ;not,,eiist 'in iJohnson v. Lincoln Hotel Co.
,(1920) 1891owa291,2177N.',W.550. And in the more recent case
ofSouthernRy...Co.v.',Tylori(App. :D.,C., 1926) 16 F(2D) 517,
itwas' held that.-ani-elevator, operator is not a "common carrier",
;b.tt'is.-equired to exercisethe same high degree of care as com,mon cari-iers for'the- safey.6f(passengers. 'It has been held also
,that the\Unite'd -Stateswas nrot, a common carrier in the operation
6fan.elevator'in -a government building devoted to government
purposes. ,Bigby v.',U.,-S. (U."S.) -103 Fed. 597, 599.
'However, -some, courts' have carried this doctrine to the extent, of 'not ofily =takinig the proprietor or employer out 6f the
,,classification, of "'common carriers", but have lessened the degree
.of care and liability to the use of orily "ordinary care and pru,Hence"-commensurate with the. danger to' be reasonably appredutnamv.;Pacific-Monthly-Co. 68 Ore. 36,130 Pac. 986,
-hended.
:136:Pac. -831,45 L. R. A. (N. S) 338, Ann. Cas. 1915 C 256. The
-reasoriing-is, based -upon the -ground that the employer is only
-bound to, exerdise ordinary, care'to provide a reasonably safe
,place and -reasonably ;safe appliances for the convenience of the
,employees-in connection, with, th6ir work. Similarly it was:-held
-in'the -case zof landlord and tenant in Edwards v..Manufacturers'
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Bldg. Co. 27 R. I. 248, 61 Atl. 646, 2 L. R. A. (N_ S..) 744 8 Ann.
cas. 974.
Jurisdictions which sustain- the, rule that the person maintaining an elevator is a common carrier of passengers, seem to
disregard, in application-to the term "common carrier", the manner of carrying, passengers, that is, whether -it be horizontal or
vertical. This-was emphasizied in the case of Sprihger v. Ford
189 Ill. 43. where an, elevator was inaintained by the owner of an.
offite building, and it was held that the rental paid by tenants-includes the compensation for the carrying, of the persons transacting business with the tenants. Maintainer of elevator held
to be common carrier in Goldsmith v. Holland Bldg.. Co. 182,Mo,
597, 81 S. W. 1112, 1114; Ohio Valley Tkust Co..v Wernke.:42
Ind. App. 326, 84 N. E. 999,1002; Snith-v. Odd Fellows- Bldg
Assn. (1922). 46 Nev. 48; 205 Pac. 796, 23 A. L. R. 38; Engstrand
v. Hartnett (1919) 106 Wash. 404, 180 Pac. 132. Escalator as
well as elevator is deemed a "common carrier" in etrie v. Kaufmann & Baer Co. 291 Pa., 211, 139 Atl. 878.
Strictly speaking an operator or proprietor of an elevator isnot a common carrier in the, legal sense ascribed to the- term.
(Seaver v. Bradley 179 Mass. 329). But in view of the decisions
reached in an overwhelming majority of the cases cited above, it
may be reasonably concluded as a general legal principle that he
owes the same degree of care as a common carrier to his, passengers.
Joseph P. Guadnola
WILLS-A will providing for the disposition- of testator's,
property, if either of his chililren should die childless, became.
operative on the child's death, Whether before or after thei death
of the testator.
One Miller by his will provided for the disposition of hisproperty "both real and personal should. either of his- children
die childless." This provision was held to refer- to their deajh
without children regardless of whether death should occur before or after testator's death, under a Kentucky Statute; Paragraph 2344, prescribing that contingent words- should, be construed as a limitation to take effect when - the person to whom
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they are applied shall die, unless a different purpose be plainly
expressed in the instrument. Lightfoot v. Beard, 20 S. W. (2nd)
90, (Ky).
The phrase dying "without issue" or "Childless" or the like,
standing alone in a will is ordinarily construed at common law
as meaning an indefinite failure of issue. 61 A. 641 (Pa); 166
U. S.83. An indefinite failure of issue has been defined as an
extinction of issue at any peri'd where the limitation over is to
take effect wherever the issue becomes extinct. 40 N. J. Law
337.
This has been the interpretation unless varied by statute,
39 A. 421 (Md) ; 246 S. W. 172 (Mo); 112 Pa- 913 (Pa); 133 S. E.
407 (N. C.), or by the intention of the testator as expressed in the
will, 36 S. E. 404 (Ga) 87 N. E. 1005 (N.Y.); 75 A. 1025 (Pa);
283 S.W. 103 (Ky).
However, courts look with much disfavor on a provision
providing for a limitation over on an indefinite failure of issue,
and so if the court can seize on an expression which denotes a
definite failure of issue, the court will not hesitate to do so. 117
A. 340 (Pa.) ; 81 S. W. 1162 (Mo) ; 125 N. W. 986 (Wis) ; 26 N. E.
1112 (Mass); 33 N. E. 482 (N. Y.); 12 Ohio St 320; 26 S.E. 716
(S. C.) ; 140 A. 708 (N. H.).
In the following cases words of suvivorship in wills are construed as referring to the death of the testator wherever the
words of the instrument do not clearly refer to a subsequent date.
97 So. 104 (Ala); 113 Ga. 526 (Ga); 115 N. E. 789 (Ind.); 165
N. W. 587 (Ia); 101 A. 19 (Conn); 129 N. E. 543 (Ill.; 122 A.
886 (N. J.) ; 211 N. Y. 772; 189 Pac. 222 (Ore).
T. J. O'Neil
FIXTURES-Refrigerator installed in a hotel sold under a
conditional sales contract held a fixture and did not constitute
part of the freehold.
The Brookville Hotel Company entered into an executory
contract of sale with the Refrigeration Sale Company under wich
the latter agreed to sell to the hotel a refrigerator to be used by
the purchaser until paid for. The contract provided that the re-
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frigerator was to be delivered by the seller to a common carrier,
the title to remain in the seller until the purchase indebtedness
was fully paid in cash. On certain contingencies or on the failure
to pay any of the installments due under the contract, the seller
was to have the option of retaking the property and retaining
as rent, depreciation, and damages the payments theretofore
made. The contract was assigned to the Commercial Finance
Company to whom the Hotel ompany paid the installments. A
balance of $163 being due and unpaid the Finance Company
sued out a writ of repleving to obtain possession of the refrigerator. The Hotel Company then brought this action for an
injunction to restrain them on the ground that the installation of
the refrigerator with the necessary pipe and other fittings caused
the refrigerator to become fixed to the realty and to lose its quality of personal property.
The court held that the refrigerator did not constitute part
of the freehold. Its character as personal property was not lost
by the installation in the building. The title was in the Finance
Company and on the failure to pay the installments due that
Company had a right to take the property by replevin. The refrigerator was personal property when the contract was made,
it was referred to in the contract as a chattel, and in the transaction between the parties it was so regarded. The bill does not
allege that the parties intended by the installation to make it a
part of the freehold, nor that the seller waived his right to repossess it in the event of the failure of'the purchaser to pay for it.
Commercial Finance Company v. Brooksville Hotel Company,
123 So. 814 (Fla.).
The majority of the states have held in accord with the principal case. 211 Fed. 244; So. 89 (Ala); 179 Pac. 154 (Colo);
93 A. 376 (Del) 151 N. E. 361 (Ind); 158 Pac. 63 (Kan); 160 N.
E. 330 (Mass); 7 So. 499 (Miss) 167 N. W. 869 (Mich); 160 S.
W. 902 (Mo) ; 43 A. 418 (N. J.); 112 N. E. 447 (N. Y.) 90 So. 564
(N. C.) ; 13 N. E. 493 (Ohio) ; 78 A. 934 (Pa); 113 S. E. 327 (S.
C.) 16 S. W. 979 (Tex); 18 A. 93 (Vt); 191 Pac. 948 (Wash);
132 N. W. 981 (Wis); 201 N. W. 845 (N. D.).
Occasionally it has been held that the conditional vendor has

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER-

the right of removal because the purchaser of the chattel, not
being- the owner thereof, has no right to annex it. 193 Pac. 909
(Ore); 142-S- E. 551 (Ga).
Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Community Mill Co., 41 Idaho,
561, 240 Pac. 446,. holds- that the parties to a condiitonal sale
contract may agree that-the chattel, though sold for the p~lrpose
of being annexed to the realty, will retain the character of personal property after annexation and title remain in the vendor
until the purchase price is paid, provided that by annexation the
chattel does, not lose, its distinctive identity or become an essential part of the structure into which it is incorporated.
California holds that though personalty may be. converted
into realty by annexation, yet where the question of title arises-.
only between the seller who retains the title and the buyer who
affixes the property to the land, the property as between the two
will- under the California Code be treated as personalty. Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 191 Pac.
524.
T. J. O'Neil
AUTOMOBILES-Contributory negligence of a motorist
colliding with parked truck without, lights, at night held for the.
jury.
In this case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant parked
his large truck on a public street without lights at about eightthirty at night; with the rear end of the truck angling out into
the street. It was raining and the plaintiff had dimmed his
lights, in passing a car coming from the other direction, about
fifty feet from the truck. He collided with the truck, not having
seen it in time and demolished his car, which, was-thrown eighty
feet from the truck by the force of the collision. The defendant
pleaded that the plaintiff was traveling at an excesive rate of
speed, to have had his own car thrown so far and was therefore
guilty of contributory negligence. The jury found that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was sufficient to bar him from
recovery. On appeal, the appellate court held that "contributory
negligence of a motorist colliding with a parked truck without
lights at night is-a question of fact for the jury" and they affirmed
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the lower -courts dedision. :M-iKee v. -Suesz. (Ind.) :167-N.-E.Z20.
In the case -6fJKoplovitz -,v. J6hnson (Ind.) '111 'N. LE. -390Ahe
same: point came up.as wasdecided in-this-case and thecSupreme
Court.of Indiana, decided -that the Jury -that, tried the -case, was
,right in weighing the -evidence-as to theplaintffs contributory
.-negligence. Here, however -it -was held :that'.the facts -did not
-show that the plaintiff was ,guilty of -contributory negligence.
-In Holtv. State 6f Indiana, 199Ind. 134, the :court, held that the
statutetequirifg lights on automobiles was apPlicTble-to parked
I
cars as well as-to-automobiles being driven.
Other jurisdictions that .follow the ,tuling: in .tliis :case. are
.Arkansas, Deleware, Iowa, Kentucky, 'Massachusetts,'New -Jersey, Ohio and --W-shington. But in Michjigan and -Minnesota
the, question of :contributory,negligence. 6f .amotorist colliding
with a truck without, lights-seems -to be-a question 6f law for the
court. 'In'Spencer-v. Taylor (Mich.) 188 N. W.-461 it was'held
'The plaintiff whose automobile --c6llided at ight with :an unlighted truck, -was: held ,guilty of contributory

-negligence.

as :a

matter 6f-law." -Also,:in Jacobs - v. Belland' (Minn.) -214 N. W.
55 the -court said, "finding -of ,negligence. in parking tru6k on
highwaywithout lights -sustained; evidence held -not to requite
finding as matter -of law-that driver of automobile colliding with
-truck parked -without light -was negligent."
Kenneth 'Konqp
-

BLOOM R.OSENBLU-MZKLINE -C>0. V. :UNION 7INDEMNITY .CO.--Jne412, :1929, (Ohio) ,167 Northwestern 884.
,-contract, of -insurance
The 'Plaintiffs :in this action
'with -the present defendants, Whereby the latterwere -to, defend
all suits instituted against' the Plaintiff, because of" liability- imposed by law-uponthe Plaintiffs for injury a cidentally -sufferedor alleged -to have been. accidentally -suffered, :by -any persons or
.person .caused by-the automobile vehicles .described. or -referred
ito in the policy, and -agreed, if -such suit he brought .to; enforce
such claim for damages, to-dferd -such -suit-whether -groundless
-ha:d

-

-a

or-not.

The question in-this -case is whether the present defendants,
,under theoabove -statement 6f-,the p6licy, -should defend a suitin
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which the present plaintiff's plea is that none of its vehicles were
in the accident, and in no way caused the injury complained of.
The defendant claims that it had the plaintiff's vehicles insured,
and since the plea of the plaintiff, in the action brought against
it, was that none of its vehicles caused the injury, then the present
defendant should not be forced to defend the action, because none
of the vehicles it had insured were implicated in the suit.. However, this court held that since the defendant had agreed to defend all claims whether groundless or not, it should have defended this action, because if the plaintiff had lost the former suit,
it would have been necessarily proved that it was one of its vehicles which caused the' injury, and thus it would clearly be the
duty of the present defendant to have defended such an action.
The material facts of the circumstances which gave rise to
this cause of action may be briefly set forth as follows:
The plaintiff in this case has a large number of automobiles
which it owns and others which it hires, and uses all of the said
vehicles for delivery purposes. The defendant is engaged in selling what is known as casualty insurance. The plaintiff wished
to have its delivery cars insured, and entered into arf agreement
with the defendant, in the form of an insurance contract, whereby
the defendant was to insure the plaintiff against loss because of
injuries accidentally suffered, by any person or persons, or the
death of such persons, resulting at the time therefrom, and caused
by any of the plaintiff's vehicles mentioned in the policy. Said
policy, as executed and delivered, contained a provision as follows :-- "In consideration of the premium determined as hereinafter provided for, it is hereby understood by and between the
named insured and the company that this policy shall cover the
operation of all automobiles and trailors of the type stated in the
policy hired by the assurea, during the term thereof and used
for the purpose stated in the declarations, without a specific description of, and specific premium charge for, each automobile to
be covered as required by this policy.
On November 30, 1926, one Stephen Terimay entered suit against the plaintiff, wherein he claimed that the plaintiff in this
action was liable to him in a large sum for personal injuries, his
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cause of action based on a claim that on November 18, 1926, he
(Terihay) was a passenger or guest in an automobile hired by the
plaintiff and used for the purpose stated in the declarations of the
policy of insurance, to wit, "commercial delivery", which automobile was being then and there operated by this plaintiff,
through certain of its employees, in the usual course of its business, and that said automobile was caused to come into violent
collision with another automobile as a result of the negligence
of this plaintiff and its employes. Said Terihay had due service
upon the present plaintiff, the plaintiff sent the service to the
present defendant as the policy called for, and the present defendant after starting to defend refused to continue; and as a result
the present plaintiff, in order to protect his interests was forced to
defend the suit himself, which he did. It was shown Terihay had
no action but he incurred $28.30 court costs and $772 attorney
fees, to enforce the payment of which by the defendant this suit
is brought.
The court held since the pQlicy provided that the operation
of all automobiles and trailors hired by the plaintiff should be
covered, and since the plaintiff proceeded according to the terms
of the policy and placed the matter in the hands of the defendent
for defense,, and the latter refused to perform even though it had
promised to defend such suits whether groundless or not, the
the plaintiff was entitled to the expense incurred in defending
the suit itself.
I The defendant claimed that it was necessary to allege that
the damages were sustained while riding in an automobile" in
fact covered by the policy, or that an automobile in fact covered
by the policy was involved in the accident.
Judge Jones in his' dissenting opinion held that by holding
the defendant liable for the costs incurred by the plaintiff in defending the former suit the court was making the defendant
liable for a car not covered by the policy.
However, the majority of the court were of the opinion that
that was begging the question, since it turned out that the automobile in which Terihay was riding was neither owned nor hired
by the plaintiff, and that the assu.red has no liability whatsoever.
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IHence-it is: obvionssthat.the plaintiff:cannat meet-the. defendant's
demandsand ,set-f6rth thatit was. one of its automobiles. which
causedor:wast inthe, accid~nt; since its defence was- that, it. hadnothing--to do with the: automoliile :which- caused- the- accident.
In meetingJudge Jone.s dissentingTopinion the court pointed
out that if the- facts- set up in Terihay's, petition had been established at the trial of that case, and'a judgment rendered thereon,
the insurance company would have been required under the
liability clause of the policy-to satisfy that judgment to the extent of the- amount: specified in the- policy. The lability of the
plaintiff would, have,- been determined at- the end of the trial.
There could lie no argument if he had been found'liable; the defendant would'have to defend or pay the costs of defending plusthe damages. Hence it is-no defense that the plaintiff waszfound
not lible.
This agreement to, make thedefense on behalfof the-assured
whenever a-.suit is, brought, against it- is- a valuable provision- of
the policy, but it-would be of little value, and would be rendered
almost meaningless-if -the-duty of the.company with respect to
the, enforcing of claims- f6r: damages- did not. arise when the action was brought against the, assured basedupon a claim of'injury by an automobile covered by such. policy. The. position
of'the assured-n-this-case evid&ntly~-was-that-no automobile-hired
by it was-involired in sucr transaction, and forthat reason Terihay's- suit was- groundless-; but before, the, assured could be relieved of this- potential liability it was. essential that it defend
itself- against- the- action- instituted by Terihay. The insurancecompany by the. express- provisi6ns of itsz policy hadi agreed to
conduct that.defense and-.pay the expense- thereof.
While itdoes&-not.apPear:that the-precise question here presented. has been- previousl considered-in any reported case, the
view herein expressed and conclusion rached upon the admitted
facts are-supported by the courts which have thus far had similar
provisions before them for- consideration, and no decisions are
to the contrary. 2-Berry on Automobiles- #2091, and the followingcases-which-are, in-point- Gi-eer-Robbins Co. v. Pacific Surity
Co, 37 Cal., App. 540 South K-noxville, Brick Co. v. Empire
State Surity C6., 126- Tenn. 402; 1'50' S. W. 92.; Mayor- Lane, &
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Co. v.Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 1-55 :N. Y. S. 75; Butler
Bros. v. American Fidelity Co., 120 Minn. 157, 1 39 N. W. :355,
44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609; Western Indemnity Co. v. Walker-Smith
Co. (Tex) -203 S. W. 93; Coast Lumber Co. v. Mtna Life .Ins.
Co., 22 Idaho, 264, 125 P. 185.
James E. Keating

